Globalization of the German Automotive Industry:
Where Does Added Value Occur?  Bertelamann Policy Brief #2019/01 by Petersen, Thieß et al.
 Page 1 
Future Social Market Economy 
 A central aspect of globalization is that companies not only sell their products all 
over the world, but the production of goods and services is divided into different 
stages of added value at home and abroad. While direct (bilateral) supplier relations 
can be understood reasonably well, the direct and indirect added value contributions 
of domestic and foreign suppliers often remain hidden. Using the German automotive 
industry as an example, we want to show the extent to which other countries 
contribute directly and indirectly to added value in this industry’s production. 
 
 
Intermediate Goods 
versus Added Value 
In order to measure the foreign contribution to 
Germany's production, it is common practice to 
consider the intermediate goods that Germany 
purchases from the rest of the world. However, 
this does not correctly capture the added value 
contributions of the country from which interme-
diate goods are purchased. If, for example, Ger-
many’s automotive industry purchases car parts 
such as an aluminum rim with a value of USD 
140 from Italy and then reprocesses them, this 
import of intermediate goods often also includes 
economic performances (added value) from 
other countries, for example aluminum that has 
been mined in China and reprocessed in Poland. 
The share of Italian added value in the car pro-
duced in Germany is then lower than the value of 
the rim imported from Italy (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 shows that the consideration of imports 
of intermediate goods does not correctly reflect 
the actual (indirect and direct) added value con-
tributions of the suppliers. If only intermediate 
goods purchased from Italy are taken into ac-
count, the contributions made by China and Po-
land to the production of a German car are not 
taken into account, while Italy's contribution is 
overestimated. Imports of intermediate goods 
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overvalue the direct supplier country’s contribu-
tion to the added value of the German automo-
tive industry and underestimate the contributions 
of all indirect suppliers. In order to correctly re-
flect the actual added value contributions of all 
countries, the upstream suppliers and their 
added value performances must also be cap-
tured. This can be done with so-called input-out-
put tables, which show the entire global economy 
(see Box 1). 
Intermediate and Added Value 
Imports of the German Automotive 
Industry 
In 2014 the German automotive industry pro-
duced goods worth around USD 445 billion. 
Products sold in Germany or abroad accounted 
for around USD 270 billion (hereinafter referred 
to as “final demand”). The remaining 175 billion 
in goods were intermediate goods that German 
automobile companies also sold at home and 
abroad. 
As described in Box 1, the added value contribu-
tions from Germany and abroad can be calcu-
lated for the final demand of the automotive in-
dustry. An analysis of the added value contribu-
tions of all the countries considered initially pro-
vides information on the share of German added 
value in the goods produced for final demand in 
the automotive sector in Germany: At around 70 
percent, the largest share of this added value is 
generated in Germany (see Figure 2). 
With regard to the significance of foreign coun-
tries for the added value of the German automo-
tive industry, a comparison with imports of inter-
mediate goods shows that there are sometimes 
substantial differences in the significance of indi-
vidual countries as suppliers of intermediate 
goods and services and as suppliers of added 
value. This concerns both the ranking of the 
Box 1: Calculation of added value contributions 
Added value contributions are calculated by using various calculation steps on the basis of global in-
put-output tables, the so-called “World Input-Output Tables” (WIOT). They are provided in the “World 
Input-Output Database” (WIOD). The methodological details can be found in Los, Timmer and Vries 
(2015) and the Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018). The results of these calculations are the added value 
contributions of individual sectors and countries to final demand, in this case the final demand of the 
German automotive industry. The calculations are carried out for 56 sectors in 43 countries and the 
rest of the world. The currently available WIOD data are from 2014. 
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countries and their actual contribution to added 
value (see Figure 3). 
Hungary, for example, is the sixth-largest sup-
plier of intermediate goods for the final demand 
of the German automotive industry. It purchases 
imports of intermediate goods from Hungary at 
an amount of around USD 6.6 billion. But Hun-
gary’s added value contribution of only USD 1.9 
billion means that it occupies only 16th place in 
the ranking of the most important added value 
suppliers. This difference is due to the fact that 
Hungary purchases many intermediate goods 
from other countries and then reprocesses them 
with a relatively low added value of its own. The 
ratio of a country’s own added value in the Ger-
man automotive industry to exports of intermedi-
ate goods for this industry is the lowest of all the 
countries analyzed here in the case of Hungary 
at 0.3. 
The situation is quite different for countries such 
as the US, China and Russia: The added value 
contribution of these countries relative to the 
manufactured and sold goods in the German au-
tomotive industry is greater than the value of the 
intermediate goods that these countries supply to 
the German automotive industry (see Figure 4). 
This means that countries such as the US, China 
and Russia provide intermediate goods that are 
not exported directly to Germany, but imported 
from other countries, reprocessed there and then 
exported to Germany. 
In the case of Hungary mentioned above, the 
added value contribution is considerably lower 
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than the value of the intermediate goods export-
ed to Germany for the automotive industry. The 
absolute difference is greater only in the Czech 
Republic (see Figure 5). 
Simulation of US Market Being 
Closed to German Cars 
On the basis of the individual added value 
shares, it is then also possible to estimate how 
great the economic damage will be for individual 
countries if production falls in one country. This 
is illustrated by the example of a complete clo-
sure of the American market to products from the 
German automotive industry. Although such a 
radical development is unlikely, even in the case 
of 25 percent import duties on German cars in 
the US, this shock illustrates the added value at 
stake in the individual countries. 
As mentioned 
above, German au-
tomakers sold prod-
ucts worth around 
US 270 billion 
worldwide in 2014. 
Almost 28 percent 
of these sales were 
generated in Ger-
many. The break-
down of other sales 
is shown in Table 1. 
Should there be a 
complete collapse 
in German automo-
bile exports to the 
US, automotive in-
dustry production in Germany would fall by 
around USD 31.5 billion or 11.6 percent of final 
demand. The added value in the other countries 
would also decline in line with the added value 
contributions. The reduction in economic added 
value – i.e. production – in Germany and abroad 
is shown in Table 2. 
Since around 70 
percent of the 
added value of pro-
duction destined for 
final demand takes 
place in Germany 
itself, Germany 
would suffer most 
from the loss of ex-
ports to the US. 
However, the pro-
duction losses in 
European countries 
such as Poland, 
China, France and 
Italy would be be-
tween USD 600 
and 750 million, 
which also means noticeable economic losses. 
 Page 5 
Future Social Market Economy Policy Brief #2019/01 
In the US, too, added value would 
decline by around USD 600 million 
due to the lower demand of Ger-
man automobile companies for in-
termediate goods from abroad. This 
means that the US would have to 
accept the sixth-largest loss in 
added value of all countries in the 
world. A look at the US’s pure ex-
ports of intermediate goods to the 
German automotive industry under-
estimates this economic damage: 
 In 2014 US exports of intermedi-
ate goods to the German auto-
motive industry amounted to 
around USD 2.9 billion. This 
means that the US did not make 
it into the top ten suppliers of in-
termediate goods (see Fig. 3, 
left). 
 If the 11.6 percent decline in 
German automobile production 
is applied to these exports of in-
termediate goods, US exports to 
Germany will fall by around 
USD 336 million. 
 However, the actual losses in  
added value in the US would be  
much higher at around USD 600 million. 
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Conclusions 
Four central conclusions can be drawn from the 
fundamental considerations and simulated exam-
ple: 
First: The importance of foreign countries for the 
economic added value in Germany cannot be 
sufficiently considered by solely looking at im-
ports of intermediate goods. What is needed ra-
ther is a calculation of the actual added value 
contained in the worldwide deliveries of interme-
diate goods. Example of German automotive in-
dustry: A mere look at imports of intermediate 
goods overestimates the importance of interme-
diate goods from the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Austria for added value in Germany. At the 
same time, it massively underestimates the role 
of the United States, the People’s Republic of 
China and Russia. In relative terms, the former 
are more transit countries for added value, while 
the latter are more countries in which added 
value originates. 
Second: The same logic can be applied to the 
appropriate significance of a sales market for the 
German economy or a German industry, which 
cannot be derived solely from German exports of 
intermediate goods abroad. Rather, added value 
exports must also be taken into account here in 
order to better determine the significance of the 
market. Example of German automotive industry: 
If additional trade barriers lead to less demand 
for German cars or car parts from the United 
States, an additional look at the added value 
share first shows that these trade barriers are 
likely to lead to a significant drop in sales at Ger-
man automakers and manufacturers because 
their added value accounts for a significant share 
of exports to the United States. 
Third: The assessment of the critical depend-
ence of an industry or an entire economy on an-
other economy – understood as vulnerability in 
the event of a total or partial disappearance of 
supply – results from the joint consideration of 
trade in goods and services intended for final de-
mand, trade in intermediate goods and trade in 
added value. The disappearance of imports of 
goods and services intended for final demand 
can have a significant impact on wages and 
prices, among other things. The disappearance 
of imports of intermediate goods would show up 
in the loss of government revenue from import 
customs; the disappearance of imports of inter-
mediate goods and added value would show up 
in the loss of private sector sales and the result-
ing loss of government tax revenue. Example of 
German automotive industry: If Germany can no 
longer import car parts from China, the corre-
sponding customs revenue will be lost. At the 
same time, if the car parts cannot be substituted, 
sales will fall or employment figures at German 
companies that depend on these car parts will 
drop – as will the tax revenue or wages to be 
paid on this basis. These losses would be espe-
cially high at companies where a particularly 
large amount of German added value depends 
on the availability of Chinese car parts. 
Fourth: The added value perspective makes it 
clear that the increasingly fragmented and com-
plex international division of labor places ever 
higher demands on its political management. Not 
only the classical bilateral relations of large inter-
mediate trading partners are important. In addi-
tion, bilateral relations with large indirect added 
value trading partners and governance along the 
entire added value chain or at central interfaces 
of the chain are also crucial. Example of German 
automotive industry: It is not enough to concen-
trate on good trade relations with Germany’s di-
rect European neighbors from which many inter-
mediate goods are imported directly. Economic 
relations with major added value suppliers such 
as the United States, Russia and China are also 
crucial. At the same time, Germany must advo-
cate international rules for managing the entire 
automotive added value chain and prevent the 
escalation of bilateral disputes between countries 
that produce many car parts for Germany or al-
low transit for them. 
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